07 May 2008

Faith and Knowledge

Welcome everyone to the Theological Discussions blog. I would like to begin by a laying of the foundation for this discussion blog on the idea of God, chiefly how could we know that whether there is a God?

Generally people fall into one of three camps concerning God. The first one is perhaps the oldest, that God(s) simply exist(s), and that either it is obvious so (the older position), or that there is enough evidence for this proposition (the more recent variant after the introduction of science).

The second camp of people are those who deny God(s) because the evidence does not support that hypothesis. This is certainly an old position, going back at least 2000 years, and very likely more (see Job). This has been making waves lately with Dawkins, Hitchens, and Harris in a front against theism.

The third camp of people fall into the "faith" category for the existence of God(s). I'll admit not being sure when this came about, but it seems more of a reaction to the second camp. That is, while there may not be empirical evidence for the existence of God(s), one just needs "faith" to believe it.

I put faith in quotation marks for a reason. The word is ultimately derived from the Latin fides, which actually meant something like loyalty. The usage is secured in English with respect to marriage, such as being faithful to one's spouse, and we get the derivative fidelity which lacks the religious "faith" connotations.

But for certain religions, belief in God(s) is "faith", used in the way not necessarily of loyalty, but rather just accepting the belief as true without empirical evidence. Hebrews 11.1 usually is trotted out for this, though I'm not sure if it can really be understood in that way. But regardless, modern Christians and some other religions tend to just have faith that God(s) exist(s), etc.

Nor is it only limited to God(s) either. People can have faith in many things. Usually, however, they don't really have faith for it, but rather they think the evidence is good enough to point to a positive reaction.

Let me take just one example. I've often heard something along the lines of "You have faith that your car will start in the morning." Well, actually, no. I don't. It might not start in the morning. I hope that it does, and the evidence usually points toward it actually starting, so I do not need to just accept that it will start.

For the car, that millions of people drive cars daily is great evidence for cars working. That my car was checked out by mechanics is more evidence that my car will work in the morning. That my car continues to start every morning is great evidence that it will start.

But one day it didn't start. But since I didn't merely have faith that it will start, my beliefs weren't shattered. I just accepted that my car didn't start, figured out why, got it fixed (had to get a running head start to crank that sucker up...which is one good thing about stick shifts), and now it starts up again. The testimony of many people who have first hand experience with tangible, measurable success with new starters is more evidence that my car will start tomorrow morning. Will it? I hope so, I'd even bet my money on it, but I would never say that I'm 100% sure, or that it is part of my beliefs that it will. It might not. It's a very real possibility, all things considered. Older cars sometimes stop working.

This is not the case with God(s). There is no empirical, measurable evidence for God(s). And for those whom claim that he/she/it/they are measurable, there doesn't exist any evidence for him/her/it/them. The God hypothesis, insofar as I have seen, has failed. No repeatable test or observation can be made to understand the proposition many people have put forth for the existence of God. With that, why should I or anyone accept God(s)?

1 comments:

Peter Kirby said...

The analogy for faith that I have heard is less something like the car example, and more something like the basic questions of ascribing physical reality to sense experience and purposive/intentional reality to other people. In the case of gods, it is something along the lines of interpreting life experience as having meaning in terms of some higher plan than your own, the higher plan being held by a god, and certain events in life may even be seen as the nudging of god towards that plan. The difference between the atheist and the theist (or theistic realist) becomes more of a gulf, like that between the solipsist and the physical realist, or that between the intentional reductivist (one who reduces seemingly intentional acts to nonintentional parts) and the intentional realist. It is the gulf between the theological reductivist (one who interprets seemingly meaningful events as meaningless) and the theological realist (one who sees meaning in life as it seems to have it). As such, it is a debate over the existence of a category of evidence, of a mode of interpretation, rather than a debate over a particular conclusion within existing modes of interpretation. For that reason, the resolution of the debate may be impossible, but in any case the debate may be better understood if framed as such.