This is a theory of knowledge that I propose to employ. It seeks to resolve the regress problem while avoiding a principal failure alleged of foundationalism, that any belief can be declared basic and thus that absurdity results.
The regress problem in epistemology refers to the argument that, if knowledge is justified true belief, and if justification requires other knowledge in order to proceed, then an infinite regress of justifications referring back to other knowledge would be required to get just one piece of knowledge established. This is supposed impossible.
Foundationalism addresses the regress problem by considering some beliefs basic, and properly so; some beliefs need no justification for themselves beyond an understanding of the basic belief. Once a set of properly basic beliefs is established, justifications can proceed by referring to them.
I am not a foundationalist. The foundationalists generally do not declare the criteria for regarding a belief as basic, and thus they are rightly open to the allegation that any belief can be declared basic, with absurd results. Furthermore, foundationalists have the problem that knowledge does not appear to proceed from a limited set of basic beliefs in actual point of fact, since people first acquire knowledge without any inkling of what a basic belief and justification from them might even be.
The main school standing opposite foundationalism is coherentism, which the Wikipedia says "hold[s] that an individual belief is justified circularly by the way it fits together (coheres) with the rest of the belief system of which it is a part." The same source goes on to say that a principal problem of coherentism is regarding the whole system as corresponding to reality, since completely false sets of consistent beliefs can be constructed.
The theory of knowledge that I hold may be termed methodism (or methodist-coherentism). This theory states that we start with methods of acquiring knowledge, which we acquire from exposure and put to the test through trial and error. Those methods of acquiring knowledge that bear fruit we keep and refine; those that do not we discard. Methods bear fruit either by allowing us to achieve the results that we desire, or by being consistent in results with methods already accepted as valid.
Methods can be quite literally any kind of heuristic or procedure, and they are rational so long as they conform to the bearing fruit principle, by allowing us to achieve results that we desire and by being consistent in results with methods already accepted as valid. There is some give in the second part of the bearing-fruit clause too; we assume that methods will possibly be refined or are only partially reliable if they are not completely consistent with other methods in their conclusions.
Methods are developed ad hoc and to the task. I have particular methods that I apply when I am trying to determine how to understand someone and respond to them, and almost entirely different methods that I apply when I am trying to understand a math problem and solve it. There is no doubt that several of our methods of acquiring knowledge are in some sense hard-wired into our species, thus saving us trial and error on the individual level. There is also no doubt that some of our methods are highly sophisticated and perhaps only accessible to domain experts.
It is this framework for understanding knowledge that I bring to the discussion. I invite others to present their own theories of knowledge.
The regress problem in epistemology refers to the argument that, if knowledge is justified true belief, and if justification requires other knowledge in order to proceed, then an infinite regress of justifications referring back to other knowledge would be required to get just one piece of knowledge established. This is supposed impossible.
Foundationalism addresses the regress problem by considering some beliefs basic, and properly so; some beliefs need no justification for themselves beyond an understanding of the basic belief. Once a set of properly basic beliefs is established, justifications can proceed by referring to them.
I am not a foundationalist. The foundationalists generally do not declare the criteria for regarding a belief as basic, and thus they are rightly open to the allegation that any belief can be declared basic, with absurd results. Furthermore, foundationalists have the problem that knowledge does not appear to proceed from a limited set of basic beliefs in actual point of fact, since people first acquire knowledge without any inkling of what a basic belief and justification from them might even be.
The main school standing opposite foundationalism is coherentism, which the Wikipedia says "hold[s] that an individual belief is justified circularly by the way it fits together (coheres) with the rest of the belief system of which it is a part." The same source goes on to say that a principal problem of coherentism is regarding the whole system as corresponding to reality, since completely false sets of consistent beliefs can be constructed.
The theory of knowledge that I hold may be termed methodism (or methodist-coherentism). This theory states that we start with methods of acquiring knowledge, which we acquire from exposure and put to the test through trial and error. Those methods of acquiring knowledge that bear fruit we keep and refine; those that do not we discard. Methods bear fruit either by allowing us to achieve the results that we desire, or by being consistent in results with methods already accepted as valid.
Methods can be quite literally any kind of heuristic or procedure, and they are rational so long as they conform to the bearing fruit principle, by allowing us to achieve results that we desire and by being consistent in results with methods already accepted as valid. There is some give in the second part of the bearing-fruit clause too; we assume that methods will possibly be refined or are only partially reliable if they are not completely consistent with other methods in their conclusions.
Methods are developed ad hoc and to the task. I have particular methods that I apply when I am trying to determine how to understand someone and respond to them, and almost entirely different methods that I apply when I am trying to understand a math problem and solve it. There is no doubt that several of our methods of acquiring knowledge are in some sense hard-wired into our species, thus saving us trial and error on the individual level. There is also no doubt that some of our methods are highly sophisticated and perhaps only accessible to domain experts.
It is this framework for understanding knowledge that I bring to the discussion. I invite others to present their own theories of knowledge.
5 comments:
Peter, I didn't realize you had become a Methodist. :-D
More seriously, your theory sounds good to me. If I understand correctly, I believe I also use the methodical approach to knowledge. The "foundational" approach doesn't make much sense to me for an introspective individual, but perhaps I've misunderstood something in its definition.
Hey Peter,
In defense of foundationalism, one also assumes relevancy and existentialism. For example, yes, any belief can be declared basic. That's when we have to choose sides. Many people are unconsciously foundationalist, i.e. they choose to believe something and nothing will dissuade them. How do you convert a foundationalist to a methodological-coherentist?
Re: methods - they can also be wrong. For example, someone may pray to god (if I understand you write, this is developing a method to their task, which is why they prayed in the first place), and then their prayer comes true. Is that validation?
If I have that wrong, please correct my misunderstanding.
Chris
The answer to your first question depends on whether there are any foundationalists. If there are not, there is no such task. If there are, the answer then depends on whether they take foundationalist theory to be knowledge or not. If they do not, there may or may not be a task, depending on the truth of the maxim in the particular case, "you can't reason someone out of something they were not reasoned into." If they do take it to be knowledge, then they have either taken foundationalist theory of knowledge as a basic belief, or they have deduced it from basic beliefs of theirs (I would say 'combined with sense experience', but I doubt that any comes to bear). If it is properly a basic belief for them, then the conversion from foundationalist assumption to anything else may be impossible, and thus again there would be no real task. The best that I could do would be to work in a subtle reductio, if they ever challenged me to convert them. That is, I could note that foundationalist theory makes every problem challenging basic beliefs one of incommensurable paradigms, and thus that if their request for means to conversion were reasonable, their theory could not be, i.e., the problem of challenging so-called basic beliefs would not be incommensurable.
I have tackled this response somewhat differently than I should tackle the general question, how would I persuade the average reasonable person that methodist-coherentism is an accurate theory of knowledge. If this is the question you really wished an answer for, I may take it up again in the near future.
This theory of knowledge refers to methods used in forming beliefs and does not really address methods of stress reduction, methods of driving, or other methods that help us get around that do not have noetic content. Prayer has a noetic component, to be sure, but a larger non-noetic, non-conceptual basis that works just as much as meditation works to provide peace of mind and good behavioral health. The conceptual content of prayer includes that there is a being to which one can pray. Prayer is not a method for arriving at this concept and at best is indirectly used in the crude and easily defeated method of "pray for something to happen; if it happens, there is a being that answered the prayer." As a method this founders when one considers contradictory beings that could be posited from the same method (Krishna, Allah, Christ); if contradiction results, one must reconsider the method. It also fails empirically in many cases (pray for something to happen and it doesn't), and we would likely revert to general understanding and scientific methods for understanding the pheneomena under consideration (someone's health or the weather, for example).
I see that there is room for elaboration on what methods are and how they are arrived at, for the understanding of the methodist-coherentist model of knowledge.
Yes, I do see where you're going with that now. I'm a foundationalist, for now, at least, so that does answer one thing. I'd like to see more about these methods.
Chris
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